

Ransomware Rebranding... So Hot Right Now!





Drew SchmittGRIT Lead Analyst

Who Am I?

- 9+ years in Infosec
- Responsible for GRIT Operations and Threat Research
- Specialty: Malware Research
- Past lives in IT, SOC, DFIR



Agenda



A Brief History of Ransomware Rebranding

- 2020 Present
- Rebranding Taxonomy
- Rebranding's effects on the Blue Team



Rebranding Case Studies

- Impacts of Rebranding on Operational Capacity
- Statistics based on Taxonomy



Tips and Tricks for Identifying Rebranding

- Code Level Analysis
- Behavioral Analysis/Threat Profiles
- Avoiding Pitfalls



Putting this Knowledge to Work


- Communicate the Intelligence
- Model the Intelligence, then Hunt it
- Call to Action: Intelligence Sharing for the Win!







Rate of Publicly Posted Ransomware Victims (2022 - Present)




Rate of Publicly Posted Ransomware Victims vs Price of Bitcoin (2022)






A Brief History of Ransomware Rebranding







A Taxonomy for Ransomware Rebranding




Rate of Publicly Posted Ransomware Victims by Group Type (2022)



Industry Targeting by Group Type








The Five D's of Rebranding

Dodge Duck Dip Dive Dodge



Patches O'Houlihan: Seven Time ADAA All-Star



Rebranding's Effects on the Blue Team

- Another group to track and categorize
- Another leak site to scrape
- ✓ More behaviors and TTPs to learn
- A never-ending cycle of intelligence gathering











Average Operating Duration by Group Type (2022)





Case Study: DarkSide to BlackMatter to AlphV



Colonial Pipeline Attack May 6, 2021 BlackMatter Shutdown Message ("Pressure from Authorities")
November 2, 2021

Rebrand Statistics:

- First Rebrand Dwell Time: < 60 days
- Second Rebrand Dwell Time: < 30 days

Extended Operations by 400+ days



Case Study: EvilCorp



Rebrand Observations:

- Rebrands often overlapped with each other
- Rebrand cadence became more frequent

Average Rebrand Duration: 38 days

Extended Operations by 400+ days







How to Spot a Rebrand

- File and Drive Enumeration
- Encryption Routines
- API Hashing/Importing Routines
- Proxy and Network Communication
- Control Flow
- Packing Routines




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SANCTIONS BE DAMNED |
FROM DRIDEX TO MACAW,
THE EVOLUTION OF EVIL CORP



In-Depth Code Analysis



```
int WINAPI WinMain
   HINSTANCE hInstance,
   HINSTANCE hPrevInstance,
              lpCmdLine,
              nShowCmd
   api::InitializeApiModule();
   api::DisableHooks();
   HANDLE hLocalSearch = NULL:
    filesystem::DRIVE_LIST DriveList;
   network_scanner::SHARE_LIST_ShareList;
    TAILQ INIT(&g_WhitelistPids);
    TAILQ INIT(&DriveList);
    TAILQ_INIT(&ShareList);
    TAILQ_INIT(&g_PathList);
    TAILQ_INIT(&g_HostList);
   HANDLE hMutex = pCreateMutexA(NULL, TRUE, OBFA("kjsidugidf99439"));
    if ((DWORD)pWaitForSingleObject(hMutex, 0) != WAIT_OBJECT_0) {
        return EXIT_FAILURE;
```

Conti Source Code Leak

Look for Code Reuse!



Don't Forget About Leak Sites



LEAKED DATA



PUBLISHED

Founded in 1942, is a company that manufactures safety marking products and engineered films such as barricade tapes, marking flags, marking whiskers, and roll

C Updated: 16 Jan, 2023, 18:47 UTC

12007 💿



17D 02h 07m 14s

em modestas instalações com a força de um jovem empreendedor que acreditou e viu a oportunidade de mudar sua vida e ao

Updated: 16 Jan, 2023, 11:53 UTC

317 **©**



18D 01h 38m 38s



ULUGÜN, General Manager Mr. Cemil ÇAĞLARKAYA, Balcan ÇAĞLARKAYA, Bora ULUGÜN Agency Manager title, We are

C Updated: 16 Jan, 2023, 11:25 UTC

314 💿

.com.sa

16D 04h 55m 48s

leading retail companies in the Middle East offering the reputed brands from across the world with finest product & customer service.

C Updated: 16 Jan, 2023, 10:42 UTC

314 💿

```
<div class="countup-block">
    <div class="countup-title">We've been working since September 3, 2019</div>
    <div class="countup" id="countup1">
        <span class="timeel years">00</span>
        <span class="timeel timeRefYears">years</span>
        <span class="timeel days">00</span>
        <span class="timeel timeRefDays">days</span>
        <span class="timeel hours">00</span>
        <span class="timeel timeRefHours">hours</span>
        <span class="timeel minutes-countup">00</span>
        <span class="timeel timeRefMinutes">minutes</span>
        <span class="timeel seconds-countup">00</span>
        <span class="timeel timeRefSeconds">seconds</span>
    </div>
    <div class="row">
        <div class="col-md-12">
            <a href="/bug-bounty" class="bugbounty-link">Web Security & Bug Bounty</a>
       </div>
</div>
<script src="/public/js/sweetalert2.all.min.js"></script>
<script src="/public/timer/countup/jquery.countup.js"></script>
<script src="/public/timer/js/script.js"></script>
<script src="/public/js/bootstrap.bundle.min.js"></script>
<script src="/public/js/modal.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
```

Websites are Code too!



Signatures, Detections, Definitions... Oh My!



















Profiling Behaviors

- Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
 - Initial Intrusion
 - Post-Exploitation
- Negotiation Tactics
- Dark Web Identities
- Communication Style and Phrase Reuse
- Rebrand Intervals
- Financial Behaviors
- Relationships with Other eCrime Groups








Watch Out! The Ransomware Ecosystem is Vast!

- Quick attribution to a known group
 - The actual core group vs the extended group often referenced by media
 - RaaS complicates things... A LOT
- Outsourcing happens
 - Code Reuse between Lockbit3 and BlackMatter
- Ransomware groups have leaks too
 - Conti Playbooks
 - Source Code
- Large groups have options, which makes our job harder... A lot harder





FOR USE WITH THE ATARI VIDEO COMPUTER SYSTEM



Case Study: BrightNight / Bl00dy

Observations:

- No traditional leak sites used in either case
 - Data leaked via Telegram or similar
- Overlapping email address used for negotiations
- Initial intrusion via exploitation of Paper Cut vulnerability
- Bl00dy leveraged leaked Lockbit 3.0 builder





What's the Point of All This?



Happy Hacker



Sad Hacker








Communicate the Single Source of Truth






Key Characteristics of Effective Threat Intel Communication

- Consumable
- Actionable
- Highly Contextualized
- Relevant
- Timely
- Rate Limited
- Easily Understood



Model the Intelligence, Inform the Hunt











Threat Intel Sharing for the Win!

- Share Threat Profiles
- Share Tools and Techniques
- Share Emerging Trends and Research
- Share Datasets
- Share Analysis Notes
- Share it All













QUESTIONS?

Thank You

Drew Schmitt

GRIT Lead Analyst

<u>Drew.Schmitt@GuidePointSecurity.com</u>

Twitter: @5ynax (me), @GRIT_Intel (GRIT)

