

## AGENDA AND SPEAKERS

- 1. Ransomware research and Nocturnus
- 2. The technical evolution of ransomware
- 3. A historical tangent
- 4. The attacker perspective
- Crisis management and the true cost to business
- 6. How Cybereason defeats ransomware
- 7. Q&A session




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## NOCTURNUS

Expert Research & Analysis on Today's Latest Threats

#### **Darkside**

Began tracking months before breach activity

#### **REvil**

Long term research,
Sodinokibi
Group behind
Travelex, JBS, Acer
& Kaseya

#### **NOTPETYA**


Discovered a ransomware vaccine to prevent machine infection



# WHY DO ATTACKERS USE RANSOMWARE?

#### **Ransomware:**

A type of malware designed to block access to systems or data until a ransom is paid.



## **RANSOMWARE**

More of an issue than ever



Increase in ransomware attacks since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic



Success rate in ransomware attempts



Organizations have encountered ransomware in their environment

"Ransomware is a problem that's continuing to get bigger"
-Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report, 2020



TECHNOLOGY NEWS MARCH 31, 2021 / 11:22 AM / UPDATED 12 DAYS AGO

#### Ransomware tops U.S. cyber priorities, Homeland secretary says

By Raphael Satter

2 MIN READ





FILE PHOTO: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas speaks during a press briefing at the White House in Washington, U.S., March 1, 2021. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque/File Photo



#### Ransomware Attacks BETA

size = size of organisation



## THE ATTACKER TOOLKIT

Factors leading to preferential use of ransomware in cyber attacks

1


Ransomware is extremely lucrative for adversaries

2

There is a lower bar of entry to deploy a ransomware attack


3

Double extortion, triple extortion = added leverage



## CYBERCRIME ECOSYSTEM

THE RaaS MODEL



## RANSOMWARE AND CRYPTO

Anonymous Currency Enables Adversaries

Crypto is connected to the RaaS Model

Cryptocurrency - Anonymous & decentralized

Payment without the personal details

Banks aren't involved

Funds are (mostly) untraceable


Not limited to Bitcoin - Monero, ZCash





Confidential and Proprietary

## **The Evolution of Ransomware**



#### THE EVOLUTION OF RANSOMWARE



#### **Known Malware**

Reused parts of existing malware



18 months ago


#### **Known Malware**


Reused parts of existing malware





Moved to using packers and encoders to bypass signature detections (AVs)












#### Network ATTACK LIFECYCLE Scanning Command & Connect to Control Corporate Beaconing Network Spear Phishing Compromise Smishing Credentials Ransomware Lateral Breach Movement

## **Attacker's Perspective**



#### RANSOMWARE TIMELINE

#### T-5 WEEKS

Exposed RDP Service exploited via weak credentials.

Initial access confirmed,
no lateral movement.

#### LATERAL MOVEMENT

Post-exploitation reconnaissance, lateral movement, and credential dumping entrenches the attacker's access

#### EXFILTRATION & RANSOM PAYLOAD DROPPED

Sensitive data, domain credentials, and recon' "work product" staged and exfiltrated. Ransomware payload deployed via GPO

#### T-1 WEEK


A focused and much more capable attacker directly accesses the same host and compromised Service Account and establishes a Cobalt Strike beach head.

#### SURVEILLANCE & TARGETED RECON

Focused monitoring of the behaviour and work cadence if IT administrators and security team, with a focus on infrastructure management tools and credentials


#### T-ZERO


Ransom note and encrypted systems discovered





## THE ANATOMY OF A REAL ATTACK











## **ACTIONS ON OBJECTION: ATT&CK MAPPING**

#### Discovery

• T1046 → Network Service Scanning

#### **Privilege Escalation**

• T1078 → Valid Accounts

#### Execution

 T1059 → Command & Scripting Interpreter

#### **Defense Evasion**

- T1090 → Connection Proxy
- T1078 → Valid Accounts
- T1108 → Redundant Access

#### **Defense Evasion**

- T1036 Masquerading
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1070 → Indicator Removal on Host
- T1553  $\rightarrow$  Subvert Trust Controls

#### **Lateral Movement**

- T1021 → Remote Services
- T1076 → Remote Desktop Protocol

#### **Impact**

• T1486 → Data Encrypted for Impact



#### Your network has been infected!



Your documents, photos, databases and other important files encrypted



To decrypt your files you need to buy our special software - General-Decryptor



Follow the instructions below. But remember that you do not have much time

#### General-Decryptor price

the price is for all PCs of your infected network

You have 8 days, 19:07:29

- \* If you do not pay on time, the price will be doubled
- \* Time ends on Mar 28, 16:30:11


Current price

214151 XMR ≈ 50,000,000 USD

After time ends

428302 XMR ≈ 100,000,000 USD

Acer ransom demand on Tor payment site



# THE GOLDEN AGE OF RANSOMWARE: A HISTORICAL TANGENT




### A Threat We've Seen Before...

- Holding goods for ransom is hardly a new business model for criminals, all that has changed is the medium.
- The Internet has matured to the point where cyberspace resembles international waters during the Age of Sail more than the "Wild West".
- Pirates, or rather privateers as many were state-sanctioned to varying degrees, serve as a historic parallel to modern ransomware gangs.
- Like their maritime counterparts, ransomware gangs:
  - Strike/retreat quickly
  - Mask their country of origin by flying false flags (for whom they may also work informally)
  - Create their own economic ecosystem of wild profitability for highly skilled workers who may otherwise lack opportunities to gain such wealth, ie the rewards far outweighs the risk.



#### ...And a Threat We Know How to Face

- If we shift our view of the current threat landscape to see navies, privateers, and pirates, rather than amorphous levels of state-support for criminal hackers, we empower our thinking with historic and recent naval military models of how to respond.
- Luckily, we also have a model for how to deal with such threats. While it won't be easy, we are not flying blind.
- Going after the means of payment, limiting opportunities, and removing safe harbors, are key steps.
- Violent whack-a-mole will not work. This criminal model cannot be stopped so long as the incentives remain.




Piracy is a nontraditional security threat that cannot be solved through military solutions . . . piracy should be rooted out by attacking sources of their strength on land, disrupting their organizational structure, and isolating them from their sources of support. In particular, this means destroying their bases and hideouts; cutting off their sources of capital, technology, and recruitment; and crippling the middlemen and markets that allow them to dispose of their loot.\*

Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, "Piracy in Maritime Asia: Current Trends," in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, Peter Lehr, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 90.



## **Crisis Management**



## RANSOMWARE RECOVERY

#### **Organizations may think**

- Cyber insurance
- Data backups
- Ability to complete recovery

Are enough - but have you considered other risks?



## RANSOMWARE ATTACKS: IMPACT TO BUSINESS

- 66% of organizations reported loss of revenue
- 53% reported brand and reputation damage
- **32%** of organizations reported losing C-Level talent
- 29% reported employees layoffs following a ransomware attack





Ransomware attacks are more than a technical crisis

Technical Crisis - locked out of systems

Legal Crisis - exposed customer data and IP

Marketing Crisis - brand damage, consumer trust

Boardroom Crisis - liability for the breach





## TO PAY OR NOT TO PAY?


- 80% who paid ransom were attacked again
- 46% who paid regained access to data, but some or all was corrupted
- 42% reported cyber insurance policy did not cover all losses





## FAILURE TO PLAN IS PLANNING TO FAIL

- 73% reported they have the right policies
- 42% believe they have the right people
- < 50% reported having antivirus
- Only **30%** reported having an EDR solution
- Only 44% invested in EPP and/or EDR after
   a ransomware attack







## Cybereason Methodologies and Capabilities




## **MULTI-LAYERED PREVENTION**







## **OPERATION-CENTRIC SECURITY**

The Ideal State





#### CYBEREASON ANALYSIS MODEL



## **Cybereason Anti-Ransomware**

Undefeated in the fight against ransomware



#### Confidently defeat ransomware

Multiple layers of defense based on behaviors and sophisticated intelligence deliver protection against modern and sophisticated ransomware.



#### Complement your existing security stack

Operate with and alongside the existing products in your security stack with a single, lightweight endpoint sensor.



#### Achieve immediate time to value

Simple, rapid deployment delivers instant protection and a less that 1% false positive rate that won't add additional work or administrative overhead.

