



DETECT . ANALYZE . REMEDIATE

## OSINT: The Secret Weapon in Hunting Nation-State Campaigns



Alon Arvatz



alon@intsights.com



+972-545444313

1

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What People Think...

# True or False?




















2

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## Using OSINT to Detect Attacks

# How Nation-state Cyber Attacks Unfold?

## *The Attack Supply Chain*

Motive	Targeting	Development	Infrastructure	Recon	Attack
					
					
					

# What Does This Mean For You

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# Step 1: Outrun Your **Competitor**


- Don't outrun the bear, outrun your competitor.
- Benchmark your digital footprint.
- Benchmark is a crucial security need!




# Benchmark in the telecom industry

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Leaked credentials



Employees on target lists





# Nation-State Attacks Motivations

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Damage



Support for  
Other Efforts



Intelligence




Profit (??)

## Step 2: Get Into The Attacker's Shoes

- How does your attacker see you?
- What is your digital footprint?
- 2 steps:
  - Monitor your digital foot print.
  - Clean your digital footprint.



# Exploitable Data



Filename	Size
<a href="#">aircraftreports.cache.csv</a>	177.8 kb
<a href="#">aircraftreports.cache.csv.gz</a>	40.1 kb
<a href="#">aircraftreports.cache.xml</a>	496.4 kb
<a href="#">aircraftreports.cache.xml.gz</a>	52.2 kb
<a href="#">airsignets.cache.csv</a>	19.7 kb
<a href="#">airsignets.cache.csv.gz</a>	5.2 kb
<a href="#">airsignets.cache.xml</a>	64.4 kb
<a href="#">airsignets.cache.xml.gz</a>	6.7 kb
<a href="#">metars.cache.csv</a>	916.2 kb
<a href="#">metars.cache.csv.gz</a>	220.6 kb
<a href="#">metars.cache.xml</a>	4109.5 kb
<a href="#">metars.cache.xml.gz</a>	304.9 kb
<a href="#">tafs.cache.csv</a>	6198.0 kb
<a href="#">tafs.cache.csv.gz</a>	287.0 kb
<a href="#">tafs.cache.xml</a>	5422.5 kb
<a href="#">tafs.cache.xml.gz</a>	311.0 kb


Apache Tomcat/6.0.24

# Exploitable Data


The screenshot shows a web browser window displaying a FishEye Source interface. The address bar shows the URL: `https://.../fe/browse/caCORESDK/branches/CACORESDK_45_BRANCH/sdk-toolkit/iso-example-project/db/db-install/mysql/SDKTestCSMSchema-mysql-template.sql?r=2031`. The breadcrumb path is: `caCORESDK / branches / CACORESDK_45_BRANCH / sdk-toolkit / iso-example-project / db / db-install / mysql`. The file name is `SDKTestCSMSchema-mysql-template.sql`. Below the breadcrumb, there are tabs for `Revisions`, `Activity`, `Users`, `Reports`, and `Source`. A dropdown menu shows `All branches and tags`. On the left, a file tree shows the directory structure, with `SDKTestCSMSchema-mysql` selected. On the right, the SQL file content is displayed, showing a series of `DROP TABLE IF EXISTS` statements followed by a `CREATE TABLE` statement for `CSM_APPLICATION`.

```
1 --
2 -- Definition of table 'CSM_APPLICATION'
3 --
4
5 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_CONFIGURATION_PROPS;
6 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_PASSWORD_HISTORY;
7 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_MAPPING;
8 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_ROLE_PRIVILEGE;
9 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_PRIVILEGE;
10 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_USER_GROUP_ROLE_PG;
11 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_ROLE;
12 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_USER_GROUP;
13 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_USER_PE;
14 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_FILTER_CLAUSE;
15 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_GROUP;
16 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_PG_PE;
17 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_PROTECTION_ELEMENT;
18 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_PROTECTION_GROUP;
19 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS CSM_USER;
20
21 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS 'CSM_APPLICATION';
22 CREATE TABLE CSM_APPLICATION (
23     APPLICATION_ID BIGINT AUTO_INCREMENT NOT NULL,
24     APPLICATION_NAME VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
25     APPLICATION_DESCRIPTION VARCHAR(200) NOT NULL,
26     DECLARATIVE_FLAG BOOL NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
27     ACTIVE_FLAG BOOL NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
28     UPDATE_DATE DATE DEFAULT '0000-00-00',
29     DATABASE_URL VARCHAR(100),
30     DATABASE_USER_NAME VARCHAR(100),
31     DATABASE_PASSWORD VARCHAR(100),
32     DATABASE_DIALECT VARCHAR(100),
33     DATABASE_DRIVER VARCHAR(100),
34     CSM_VERSION VARCHAR(20),
35     PRIMARY KEY(APPLICATION_ID)
36 )
```

# Clean Your Digital Footprint



A screenshot of a web browser showing a Ghostbin paste. The browser's address bar displays the URL `https://ghostbin.com/paste/9oxfe`. The page title is "Paste 9oxfe" and the content type is "Plain Text". The paste contains a list of 35 email addresses, each preceded by a line number from 1 to 35. The email addresses are: 1. y69@yahoo.com:Steven69, 2. 52@yahoo.com:Topshop26, 3. ter147@hotmail.co.uk:Trafford1, 4. ett@hotmail.com:Sheare9, 5. yahoo.com:Mannoorai2, 6. yahoo.com:!!NGMIKE28, 7. is@fsmail.net:a61BF4u9, 8. hotmail.com:Nafets88, 9. nday@ntlworld.com:Rocky5, 10. c@yahoo.com:Carl1234, 11. l3@gmail.com:ZacArmistead1, 12. ff90@gmail.com:Metalgear3, 13. hotmail.com:METALlica1, 14. legend@aol.com:Extereme11, 15. sn.com:Merlin14, 16. ail.com:AB54thL0n, 17. k@gmail.com:Decmay26, 18. yahoo.co.uk:1Clubcard1, 19. mail.com:Evertontfc1, 20. eo@googlemail.com:Whitbread8, 21. ome.com:3Xc4118ur, 22. octor@hotmail.co.uk:St0n3y999, 23. 81181@hotmail.com:Karen230607, 24. l@gmail.com:Bunker567, 25. 73@hotmail.co.uk:Paris2015, 26. hotmail.com:Squierbass1, 27. nsights.com:Myne141, 28. l088@gmail.com:20Shadow20, 29. otmail.com:LittleMo42, 30. n1988@gmail.com:Lucyren1, 31. yahoo.co.uk:Ryanzach25, 32. mail.co.uk:Morgan2007, 33. hotmail.co.uk:Benson12, 34. ffe@gmail.com:801locks, 35. mail.orbitel.bg:^StaraPlanina^




A screenshot of a Pastebin page. The page has a dark blue header with the "PASTEBIN" logo, a "new paste" button, and navigation links for "trends", "API", "tools", and "faq". A search bar is also present. The paste is titled "Untitled" and is by "A GUEST", dated "OCT 13TH, 2016", with 76 views and "NEVER" comments. There are "SHARE" and "TWEET" buttons. A message asks if the user is a member and encourages signing up. Below the message, there are buttons for "text", "12.49 KB", "raw", "download", "clone", "embed", "report", and "print". The main content area shows a table with 12 columns: Partner Name, Sales Contact, Address City, State, Zip Telephone, Sales Contact Email, URL Report, Contact Report, Email Report, and Phone Report. The table has 7 rows of data, with the first row being a header and the subsequent rows containing contact information for various companies. The content is partially obscured by a large blue rectangle.

1.	Partner Name	Sales Contact	Address City	State	Zip Telephone	Sales Contact Email	URL Report	Contact Report	Email Report	Phone Report
2.	Juniper Sponsor									
3.	Adaptive									
4.	Chris Vig									
5.	Adaptive									
6.	DuBois gd									
7.	Advanced									
8.	aaron.gra									
9.	Ansley Co									
10.	cansley@a									
11.	AT&T									
12.	source=IG									



# Step 3: Monitor The Dark Web

- What is the Dark Web?
- Hackers #1 interest – Anonymity.



# They Are On The Dark Web!



## What are they doing on the Dark Web?

- Recruiting/Hiring.
- 0days.
- Staying up-to-date.

\*OpClever, Cylance

# Recruiting

## 联系方式 - 简历详细信息

[www.job51.com/person/.../Resume\\_1.asp?... - China - Translate this page](http://www.job51.com/person/.../Resume_1.asp?...)

1999.12至2004.12 总参三部二局 (61398部队) 驾驶员2005. 3至2006.3 深圳国叶世成科技有限公司驾驶员2006.5至2008.5 上海市星眸进出口有限公司驾驶 ...

## 592招聘-连云港司机求职找工作-招聘首选592招聘网

[www.job592.com/cv/120209/person1266063.html - Translate this page](http://www.job592.com/cv/120209/person1266063.html)

1999.12 至2004.12 总参三部二局 (61398 部队) 驾驶员 2005. 3 至2006.3 深圳国叶世成科技有限公司驾驶员 2006.5 至2008.5 上海市星眸进出口有限公司驾驶员 ...

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网友个人资料



新飞行员


用户ID:	(o)5681		
性 别:	男		
所在城市:			
个人主页:			
Email:	uglygorilla@163.com		
用户昵称:	绿野		
经验值:	44 [新飞行员]		
发表文章篇数:	15		
上站次数:	14		
上次到站时间:	2004-03-17 21:43:11.0		
真实姓名:	JackWang	工作单位:	
MSN:		ICQ/OICQ/QQ:	
联系电话:			

没有个人说明档

查看他(她)的所有帖子  
关闭窗口


\*APT1, Exposing one of China's Cyber Espionage Units, Mandiant

# Outsourcing



Search results

HSBC UK	Posted on	6 March 2015	by	Godfather	category	data
Citibank	Posted on	24 April 2015	by	Demander	category	services
Air Berlin	Posted on	16 May 2015	by	Demander	category	data
Bank of America	Posted on	8 June 2015	by	AMAZON	category	services



Ashleymadison  
Need data & service PM me ASAP if you have it  
Don't waste time if you don't know what I'm talking about  
big job big opportunity

Diablo  
Member

Joined: June 2015  
Posts: 0


Diablo 26 June at 11:28 PM

\*Exposed by Noam Jolles, Diskin Advanced Technologies

# How Can They Be Detected?

**I buy vulnerabilities , Expensive, \$\$\$\$**Outline · [ Standard ] · Linear +

Track this topic | Send to a friend | print version

**vulns**  
Eksplobayt  
Group: Members  
Posts: 169  
Joined: 03.07.2017  
Member number: 77 285  
Business: [Safety](#)  
Reputation: 55  
(6% - good) +

03/31/2017, 06:18

Sent # 1

Details in the signature. Interested in everything, including an interesting software.  
The priority 1day / 0day exploits LPE / RCE by client applications.  
The initial budget of \$ 500k, more proof in the signature.  
You can discuss any work environment. I work with intermediaries.  
For serious proposals can fill the 5-digit amount in the deposit.  
I do not work in the CIS.

\* All but lockers, billing, cc from, trojans and bank fraud schemes (atm / village etc.).  
\*\* If you are a mediator, please indicate the contact.  
\*\*\* safeguards and verification at my expense, without a guarantor - without prepayment.

Post edited vulns - 31/3/2017, 07:03

-----  
I buy virtually any 1day / 0day vulnerability bd, operating time of the circuit. Budget from \$ 1kk.  
Contact PM or jabber in the profile.

BEGIN BITCOIN SIGNED ----- MESSAGE  
Proof of ownership 19XSWmHsD1Qq3vbNgtNjgQM4XXKff76AShs  
----- BEGIN SIGNATURE ----- BITCOIN  
Address: 19XSWmHsD1Qq3vbNgtNjgQM4XXKff76AShs  
HDDGU08mmTeWdR7E3 + YZuDJsIV4ChoBsqMWdAQVttapcy8fcSTr4wTrqOjQ1MeHxxLCPQGfIqo69AWgTE  
rv84jA8 =  
----- END SIGNATURE BITCOIN -

For the lazy:  
-----

- Nation State Actors on the Dark Web
  - Very few posts.
  - Very laconic.
  - Don't contribute.
  - Looking for 0days.
  - Unlimited budget.



# How Can They Be Detected?


## Bitcoin Address

Addresses are identifiers which you use to send bitcoins to another person.

Summary	
Address	<a href="#">15mpmTA7V3Px8uak1rctZ878NzU2VMtKwX</a>
Hash 160	<a href="#">345aad8075e3a26a3ffe748552d4ad6dbab19fd</a>
Tools	<a href="#">Related Tags</a> - <a href="#">Unspent Outputs</a>

Transactions	
No. Transactions	2
Total Received	366.05180317 BTC
Final Balance	0 BTC

Request PaymentDonation Button



### Transactions (Oldest First)

Filter ▾


<a href="#">e678c8aaf0e4dc97e637dc6d3c38a160c24356ea7262078828ee4f5bb3e980f9</a>	2016-05-04 09:43:39
15mpmTA7V3Px8uak1rctZ878NzU2VMtKwX	
	1Dwh2Xpe7Zt5kvjVsqMdwTDFhGxhNAjXVj 0.549 BTC
	16bfeZRhjRjFhw9uPWR1sPUsKrwo6iKTaH 0.0096288 BTC
	1MjqGvR2MAJzquCqFn4awTigbYbgGGAwcQ 271.59928586 BTC
	19g5EYXUqxSTSzjKWEbPCEbC9nGN3pe4s3 3.893399 BTC
	19XSWmHsD1Qq3vbNgtNjgQM4XKf76AShs 90 BTC
	-366.05180317 BTC
<a href="#">8a7f70a3adacd3d592b0274e99290bb939b12a38557fc52409e09e4cf7cee46e</a>	2016-05-04 09:27:12
1JcGVaRG78L3XKsACcP5SYGAFmFqfHCpNX	
	15mpmTA7V3Px8uak1rctZ878NzU2VMtKwX 366.05180317 BTC
	366.05180317 BTC

# Step 4: Weapon Deployment

- States collaborate on closed networks but organizations are on the surface.
- In order to attack, states have to reach the surface, and that leaves them exposed.

TI can help detect:

- **Phishing attacks**- fake domain registration.
- **Malicious mobile applications**
- **Fake social media profiles**



# Fake Social Media Profiles

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Cyberwarfare Fraud & Identity Theft Phishing Malware Tracking & Law Enforcement

Home > Fraud & Identity Theft



## Iranian Attackers Use Fake LinkedIn Profiles to Target Victims

By Eduard Kovacs on October 08, 2015

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5

Tweet

f Recommend 47

RSS

A threat group believed to be operating out of Iran has created a network of fake LinkedIn profiles as part of a campaign aimed at individuals in the Middle East and elsewhere, Dell's SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit reported on Wednesday.

The attackers, dubbed "Threat Group-2889" or "TG-2889," appear to be the Iranian-sponsored hackers whose activities were documented by endpoint security company Cylance in a December 2014 report focusing on a campaign called "[Operation Cleaver](#)."

The group behind Operation Cleaver has been active since at least 2012 and it has targeted more than 50 companies across 16 countries, including organizations in the military, government, oil and gas, energy and utilities, chemical, transportation, healthcare, education, telecommunications, technology, aerospace, and defense sectors.

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» [Leaked Documents Show US Vote Hacking Risks](#)


















» [Organizations Failing to Upgrade Systems, Enforce](#)

Intsights

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# How Nation-state Cyber Attacks Unfold?

## *The Attack Supply Chain*

Motive	Targeting	Development	Infrastructure	Recon	Attack
  	  	  	  	 	  

Benchmark  
Exploitable Data  
Data Leakage

Dark Web monitoring

Phishing domains  
Malicious mobile apps  
Fake social media profiles

Exploitable Data  
Data Leakage

# Conclusion: OSINT Is Critical

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## Eliminates Blind Spots




1. Optimized risk picture with an aggregated and coordinated view across internal and external threats.
2. Context to effectively scope alerts or gauge the severity of a threat.

## Enable Proactive Security



1. Connect external threats with your enterprise before they attack.
2. Capture early warning signals.

## Operational Efficiency



1. Actionable visibility
2. Automate remediation for internal and external systems
3. Metrics and visibility showcasing security's impact.



# Thank You

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Alon Arvatz



[alon@insights.com](mailto:alon@insights.com)



+972-545444313